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THE SCHOLARSHIP OF KENNETH PYE
Francis A. Allen*
n considering the career of Kenneth Pye, we are in danger of thinking
of him solely as a distinguished administrator of rare executive quali-
ties. He was, after all, a university president, a university chancellor,
law school dean, president of the Association of American Law Schools,
and the guiding spirit of a leading legal-aid association. But Kenneth Pye
was also a teacher and a scholar, and his commitments in these latter
capacities were central to his life and thought. It is impossible fully to
grasp the aspirations that moved him as an educational administrator
without giving close attention to his career in the classroom and to his
written work.' Despite what might seem the overwhelming demands of
his administrative obligations, he produced a substantial corpus of writ-
ing.2 There are two principal reasons for considering his written produc-
tions at this time. First, the writings throw light on his character and
intellectual commitments. There is a morality of scholarship, and often
much can be learned of the fiber and capacities of the individual by test-
ing how he or she responds to the ethical demands of the intellectual life.3
Second, much in the corpus of Pye's written work, produced over almost
four decades of the recent past, remains relevant to present needs and
concerns. Perhaps because so much legal literature is produced in the
United States today, there is a tendency for the work of the past, even
that of highest quality, to sink into speedy oblivion. The wisdom and
insights of Kenneth Pye's scholarship, if attended to, could make impor-
tant contributions to the present. We cannot afford to neglect them.
* Edson R. Sunderland Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Michigan. and Hu-
ber C. Hurst Eminent Scholar Emeritus, University of Florida.
1. It is my clear impression that Pye often regretted the diversion of his efforts from
scholarship and teaching necessitated by performance of his administrative obligations,
and that he looked forward to a period when he could devote much more time to the
former.
2. Speaking of another law school dean, Pye once wrote: "Only a few [academic ad-
ministrators] have found it possible to combine administrative expertise with genuine
scholarship in the classroom and in print." A. Kenneth Pye, Frank T. Read, 15 TULSA L.J.
7 (1979). Certainly he himself was included among the few.
3. This is often, but not always, true. The scholar who honors all the strictures of
scholarly production in his written work, but who neglects the same principles of candor
and fairness in his personal relations, is a phenomenon not unknown on university cam-
puses. Kierkegaard somewhere (I have lost the reference) refers to philosophers who in
their books construct magnificent mansions of ethical theory, but who in their private lives
are content to live in tawdry hovels next door. No one whose character was as strong and
integrated as Kenneth Pye's could be described in this way.
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What follows in this brief essay must be regarded only as a sampling of
his scholarship, not a systematic survey.
Kenneth Pye's first contribution to the law journals as a faculty mem-
ber appeared in 1956 when he was just twenty-five years of age. As with
many of us, his maiden effort was a book review, in this instance a review
of a volume on military justice, reflecting his just-concluded experience as
a military lawyer in the Korean war.4 A steady stream of essays, articles,
and reviews followed until its untimely conclusion early in this decade.
Any generalizations concerning a body of work of such size, produced
over so long a period, must in many respects be fallible. Yet a few gen-
eral observations may be risked.
Pye was a member of the group of legal scholars who began their work
under the influence of the liberalism that flourished in the years immedi-
ately following the Second World War. It was a liberalism that placed
great weight on the rights of individuals confronting the weight of state
authority in the criminal process. It contained a strong egalitarian strain.
It was idealistic in that it fostered the conviction that the problems of
poverty and the wounds of racism can be overcome by intelligent and
dedicated action, action both of individuals and of agencies of govern-
ment. As Learned Hand once observed, liberalism is less a creed than a
frame of mind.5 It is a mind-set that has faded in recent years. Even law
teachers today are sometimes heard asserting with a fine scorn that the
"liberal model" can no longer serve as a "template" for American soci-
ety. All of Kenneth Pye's work, in varying degrees of intensity, reflects
the liberal frame of mind. His liberalism, however, was strongly colored
by his personal values. Both temperament and experience produced in
him an intensely pragmatic approach to social and legal issues. He was
not a visionary. He understood from the start that the ultimate test of
social theory is social reality, hence knowledge of social reality became
for him a prime requisite. Much of his realism stemmed from direct par-
ticipation in the processes of criminal justice, but much also was acquired
through conscientious study. The command of facts was one of his lead-
ing characteristics, both as a scholar and an administrator.6
There were other dimensions to Kenneth Pye's liberalism. Although
strongly supportive of the rights and immunities of persons caught up in
4. A. Kenneth Pye, Military Justice in the Armed Forces of the United States, 9 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 135 (1956) (book review).
5. Letter from Judge Hand to the Honorable Charles Fremont Amidon (Feb. 24,
1928), quoted in part in GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE
443 (1994).
6. One good example of the comprehensive marshalling of data that characterized
Pye's work is his article, Legal Education Past and Future: A Summer Carol, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 367 (1982). The article shows familiarity with population trends, Department of
Labor projections of legal employment, consultants' memoranda on tuition and financial-
aid trends, studies of the "opportunity gap" in employment placement between graduates
of the "most renowned" law schools and graduates of other schools, studies of a growing
discrepancy between salaries paid top law school graduates and those paid members of law
faculties, the effects of inflation on faculty salaries, and statistics on the exponential in-
crease in library expenditure. Id. at 368-74.
[Vol. 49
TRIBUTE
the criminal justice system, he was sensitive to the critical need for preser-
vation of basic social institutions against anarchistic assaults on the peace
and good order of the community. Moreover, his espousal of individual
freedom against unwarranted exertions of public authority was flanked
by a strong sense of personal and professional responsibility. Liberty for
him was not a license to withdraw from the clamor of his times, but an
opportunity to confront and ameliorate the ills of his society.
A word needs to be said about the style of Pye's scholarship-his liter-
ary style and mode of argument. It is interesting to observe how early in
his career the young professor found his own distinctive voice. The prose
is simple and direct, often emphatic and sometimes abrupt. The argu-
ment is typically "fact-based." Repeatedly, he punctures arguments and
generalizations by revealing what we do not know. He called for more
empirical inquiry in the administration of criminal justice, and decried the
fact that reporters of the American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure failed to undertake such studies preliminary to
the drafting of the Code.7 He added the caveat, however, "that we
should be careful that such projects are not designed with the object of
collecting information either to sustain or refute police objections. They
must be aimed solely at determining the truth, not 'assembling the data'
for a brief in which the conclusion has already been reached."8
At times the writing takes on an epigrammatic quality. Commenting
on the pre-trial detention of criminal suspects, he wrote: "We seem to be
quite willing to lock up defendants before trial when they are presumed
to be innocent, and to release them when they have been found guilty."9
Many years later he ruefully observed:
I have, on occasion, facetiously commented that the difference be-
tween a CEO of an educational institution and a CEO in the busi-
ness sector is that in the business sector, a direct order and pointed
suggestions are taken seriously, while at a university, a direct order is
viewed as an agenda for debate, and pointed suggestions may be re-
garded as the desultory ramblings of a madman. 10
Speaking of the right to counsel, he said: "The game is quite different
when each side has a goalie.""
Kenneth Pye's scholarship was dedicated to logic and fact, but it also
rested on the bedrock of his basic moral convictions and sense of de-
cency. His scorn for the hypocrisy and insensitivity to human values en-
countered in the functioning of social institutions often broke through the
7. A. Kenneth Pye, The Supreme Court and the Police: Fact and Fiction, 57 J. CRIM.
L., CRIMINOLOGY & POL. Sci. 404, 406 (1966).
8. Id.
9. A. Kenneth Pye, Reflections on Proposals for Reform in Federal Criminal Proce-
dure, 52 GEO. L.J. 675, 690 (1964).
10. A. Kenneth Pye, What's Wrong with Our Universities-An Additional View, 14
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 335, 351 (1991).




surface of his writing. 12 He protested the provisions of the A.L.I.'s Code
of Pre-Arraignment Procedure that would deny impoverished suspects
the right to counsel in the early stages of the criminal process, 13 and was
outraged, with other commentators,' 4 by the statement of Attorney Gen-
eral Katzenbach that the "suggestion that police questioning will primar-
ily affect the poor and, in particular, the poor Negro.... [is] particularly
irrelevant."'1 5 Pye's reaction to the Code provisions lays bare some of his
deepest convictions:
The resolution of these problems in a sense poses the basic question
of the kind of society in which we wish to live. The various proposals
to discard the Mallory rule are grounded upon the basic proposition
that we can and should rely on the weakness and ignorance of the
citizen to confess when he is isolated from his family and friends and
subjected to police interrogation in an alien environment. This is
necessary because the police need confessions in order to solve more
cases and obtain more convictions. Society is asked to deemphasize,
if not ignore, the fact that the major weaknesses in our system of
criminal justice stem from society's inability to cope with crime cau-
sation, the inadequacy of the criminal law alone to deal with the un-
derlying social problems that manifest themselves in violations of
law, society's inability to try all the guilty defendants now brought
before the courts because of the shortage of judges, prosecutors, and
physical facilities, and the tragic weakness of correctional programs.
12. See, e.g., A. Kenneth Pye, Criminal Justice 1968: Developments and Directions, 17
CATH. U. L. REV. 428, 448-49 (1968).
Rights given to individuals are now being implemented and enforced. Expe-
rience may indicate that the requirements of law enforcement are inconsis-
tent with some of these rights. If this proves to be the case, society may
determine to limit the rights of its citizens. Such an approach is far sounder
than paying lip service to sham rights which do not exist in practice.
Id. (citations omitted).
13. A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §§ 4.04,4.05,5.08 (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1966). Pye's opposition is stated in at least two of his articles: The Supreme
Court and the Police: Fact and Fiction, supra note 7, at 415; Charles Fahy and the Criminal
Law, 54 GEO. L.J. 1055, 1065 (1966).
14. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Has the Court Left the Attorney General Behind? 54 Ky.
L.J. 464, 472 (1966):
The issue is not whether the government should ignore crime caused by pov-
erty and ignorance, but whether with respect to the assertion of the privilege
of self-incrimination or the right to counsel or the protection against unrea-
sonable search and seizure, the government should exploit the influences of
poverty or ignorance-or seek to minimize them.
Id. at 496-98 (quoting Letter of Anthony G. Amsterdam to the Hon. David L. Bazelon,
United States Courts of Appeals (July 2, 1965)).
15. Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, in a letter addressed to Judge David L.
Bazelon, dated June 24, 1965, stated in part:
Your suggestion that police questioning will primarily affect the poor and, in
particular, the poor Negro, strikes me as particularly irrelevant. The simple
fact is that poverty is often a breeding ground for criminal conduct and that
inevitably any code of procedure is likely to affect more poor people than
rich people.... A system designed to subject criminal offenders to sanctions
is not aimed against Negroes, Mexicans, or Puerto Ricans ... simply because
it may affect them more than other members of the community.
Quoted in Kamisar, supra note 14, at 492.
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Instead, we should focus our concern upon catching more of the
guilty and procuring their guilt from their own lips. 16
No attentive reader of Pye's writing can for long be unaware of the
depth of feeling it communicates. Yet his devotion to fact and reason
protected him from capture by mere feeling. His dedication to rationality
and the lessons learned as a criminal justice participant brought him at
many points in his scholarly career to positions not often associated with
the liberal stereotype.
One final general observation is required. A reader approaching Ken-
neth Pye's writing for the first time will almost certainly be impressed by
the breadth of his work, by the range of topics addressed, and by the
scope of the analysis devoted to individual topics. Very early in his ca-
reer, for example, he recognized the importance of placing many of the
issues he considered in an international context. While still in his twen-
ties he was co-author of an article that attempted to fashion an approach
to comparison of American and foreign systems of criminal justice. 17
Studying the language of foreign statutes is not enough, he argued, for in
all systems of justice there are wide chasms between "law in the books"
and "law in action." "Such factors as the traditions of the bar and the
integrity of the police may be more important than a grandiose statement
of the rights of an accused in the constitution. Unfortunately, an appreci-
ation of these factors requires intensive personal observation of the
bench, bar, and actual court proceedings." 1 8
There is another level of difficulty encountered in the search for under-
standing of our own or foreign institutional systems, a proposition I be-
lieve to be implicit in the article's argument. Observations of systems in
operation are crucial, but simple observation only partially answers why
institutional habits have developed as they have and, when these habits
result in unhappy consequences, why deficiencies of decency and effi-
ciency are hard to repair. Kenneth Pye's scholarship is anything but pa-
rochial. It presents a fair cross-section of the theoretical and operational
issues confronted in much of the legal thought of his time.
I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION
The paragraphs that follow present a necessarily truncated view of sev-
eral areas of particular concern to Kenneth Pye and to which he made
important contributions. In 1968 he published a widely read and much
16. Pye, Charles Fahy and the Criminal Law, supra note 13, at 1065.
17. Joseph M. Snee & A. Kenneth Pye, Due Process in Criminal Procedure: A Com-
parison of Two Systems, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 467 (1960).
18. Id. at 473. Pye's other articles containing an international or comparative focus
include an essay properly critical of Canadian constitutional provisions dealing with the
rights of criminally charged persons. The Rights of Persons Accused of Crime Under the
Canadian Constitution, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 246 (1982) ("in areas where the
danger of governmental abuse is great, the constitution provides few protections"); see also
The Effect of Foreign Criminal Judgments in the United States, 32 UMKC L. REv. 114
(1964); The Legal Status of the Korean Hostilities, 45 GEO. L.J. 45 (1956).
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admired article in the Michigan Law Review, entitled The Warren Court
and Criminal Procedure.19 In it he displayed again one of the distinguish-
ing characteristics of his work: an impatience with the discrepancies be-
tween articulated ideals and actual institutional performance. He
deplored "the disparity between the reality of the criminal process and
the ideal of civilized conduct to which we as a nation had sworn alle-
giance" that typified federal and especially state criminal procedures in
the pre-Warren Court era.20 He lauds the Warren Court for narrowing
the gap between promise and performance:
The gulf between the illusion and reality of constitutional protection
has been narrowed. The quality of justice meted out to the poor
more closely approximates that available to the rich. In many areas
we are beginning to implement rights to which we have paid lip-ser-
vice for decades. We have begun to remove much of the hypocrisy
which characterized our criminal process. 21
Pye saw the Warren Court's activism in criminal cases as an almost
inevitable result of its confrontation with the problems of race and ine-
quality in American society. Criminal cases could not be excluded from
that confrontation because the treatment of minority citizens in state sys-
tems of criminal justice produced some of the most virulent manifesta-
tions of inequality. He applauded the Court for accurately perceiving the
true nature of the issues coming before it in the criminal cases:
It is to the credit of the Court that it recognized that the nation was
in the midst of a social revolution before this became apparent to
most of the elected representatives of the people, and it sought to
eliminate the basic defects in our system for the administration of
criminal justice within our present structure. 22
One can only speculate how Kenneth Pye would have responded to the
current fashionable espousals of "localism" and the hostility directed to
all exertions of federal authority (except, perhaps, those advancing the
particular interests of the speaker). It is clear that Pye believed many
important decisions within the justice system can best be made locally; he
was an early exponent, for example, of "block grants" to states and locali-
ties in the administration of federally-funded programs of legal aid for the
poor.23 It was also clear to him that exercises of federal judicial power in
the criminal process are not only appropriate, but essential to basic
freedoms:
It is not surprising that the majority of the Court has accepted the
argument that the genius of federalism does not require that states
be permitted to experiment with the fundamental rights of defend-
ants in criminal cases any more than it permits experimentation with
19. 67 MICH. L. REV. 249 (1968).
20. Id. at 253.
21. Id. at 254.
22. Id at 256.




first amendment freedoms. 24
In 1968, Kenneth Pye was convinced of the permanence of the Warren
Court's contributions toward a more healthy American society and opti-
mistic that they would be followed by further amelioration of the inequal-
ities separating rich and poor, black and white, in American life.25 As he
wrote, however, Congress was attempting to repeal legislatively some of
the judicial advances of the Warren years, a fact explicitly adverted to in
the article.26 Indeed, the late 1960s may be seen as marking the end of an
era in which criminal policy in the United States was based significantly
on the principles of liberal politics, in which efforts were made to achieve
not only crime repression, but also in some measure social reconcilia-
tion.27 The almost three decades that followed are the era of the "war on
crime" in which the objectives are seen to be almost exclusively those of
repression and incapacitation. The new mood has patently affected the
adjudication of the Supreme Court. Its restatement of the law of the
Fourth Amendment sufficiently demonstrates the point.28
Whether or not events subsequent to his 1968 article suggest that Pye
was unduly sanguine about the progress made in the Warren years, it
should be noted that his optimism never overcame his critical faculties.
His attitudes toward Miranda v. Arizona,29 perhaps the most important
of the Warren Court's criminal cases, are revealing. He welcomed the
decision and admired the support given the majority of the Court by
other commentators, in particular Yale Kamisar.30 But the measured
tone of his own analysis was distinctive:
The fact of the matter is we do not know what, if any, effect the
decisions will have in law enforcement. There have been loud
protestations of impending doom from some police officials.... Lim-
itations on interrogation may affect the proof of guilt in causes
cilebres such as those involving a solitary killing or a rapist. These
cases are important but they constitute a minute percentage of
crimes committed. They are not so numerous that they have a major
impact on the administration of criminal justice.31
Writing before the advent of such developments as DNA evidence, he
noted that other methods of solving "high profile" cases may result from
"greater technological assistance to police forces."' 32 On the whole he
24. Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, supra note 11, at 258.
25. "It seems doubtful that any substantial long-term retreats will be taken from the
positions already assumed by the Court." Id. at 267.
26. Id. at 265.
27. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE HABITS OF LEGALITY: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE
OF LAW 27-28 (1996).
28. John M. Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of the Protec-
tion, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105 (1989).
29. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
30. Professor Kamisar's articles are collected in his book, POLICE INTERROGATION
AND CONFESSIONS (1980).
31. A. Kenneth Pye, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants: Some Views on Miranda v.




welcomed the Miranda decision, not only for the values asserted by the
majority of the Court, but also as an opportunity to gain a more penetrat-
ing empirical understanding of the criminal justice system. After all, the
procedures mandated by the Court "must be placed in practice before
their effects can be known. '33 He was willing to accept the verdict of
actual experience: "If the fears of the dissenters prove justified, it may be
necessary to reconsider whether society can afford the luxury of the val-
ues protected and implemented in the decisions. ' 34 Yet for the present
he strongly approved the Miranda decision and expressed his assent by
recalling a quotation of Benjamin Disraeli: "Any other result would have
permitted precedent [to] embalm a principle. '35
For all his interest in the performance of the Warren Court, it seems
accurate to say that Kenneth Pye was not primarily concerned with the
emerging and sometimes evanescent intricacies of constitutional doctrine.
His greater attention remained engaged by the actual operations of the
criminal justice system, many aspects of which implicated values of high-
est importance but some of which were not and perhaps could not be
adequately confronted as problems of constitutional doctrine. His earli-
est writing urges the reform of various aspects of American criminal pro-
cedure. "For years," he wrote, "we have stood like Kafka's advocates
adapting ourselves to existing conditions and resisting any temptation to
seek change, no matter how much present practices go against the
grain."' 36 While in his early thirties, he published a brief but eloquent
case for expanding discovery rights of defendants in criminal cases:
[A] day will come when we will look back with incredulity on a crim-
inal trial, the hallmark of which was the surprise witness who could
not be successfully impeached because of the absence of discov-
ery .... The destruction of the fox hunt concept of a criminal pro-
ceeding requires that both sides be given opportunity to prepare for
the issue which will be litigated at trial. 37
And again: "My thesis is simple. More liberal discovery is necessary to
insure that each defendant receives a fair trial."'38 Since these early publi-
cations, strides have been made in many American jurisdictions toward
recognition of broader discovery rights for criminal defendants.39 It
seems likely that Pye's polemics contributed to this salutary trend.
In 1978, Kenneth Pye published an article which again demonstrated
how persistently his thought resists facile stereotyping. It is an essay of
particular interest to a society emerging from the trauma of the O.J.
33. Id. at 210.
34. Id. at 219.
35. Id. at 220.
36. A. Kenneth Pye, Reflections on Proposals for Reform in Federal Criminal Proce-
dure, 52 GEO. L.J. 675, 685 (1964).
37. Id. at 689-90.
38. A. Kenneth Pye, The Defendant's Case for More Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 47,
82 (1963).




Simpson trial, for in it he ruminates on the adversary system-its legiti-
mate functions, what can and cannot be justified in its name. The article
bears the intriguing title, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of
Truth.40
The argument begins with the observation that there are times when
defense counsel would be remiss in failing to take action that has the
effect of suppressing truth.41 The problem is one of establishing criteria
that adequately determine when action having this result should be al-
lowed. Clearly, he wrote:
[A] lawyer's conduct [cannot] be justified by the observation... that
"ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial system," and
that the adversary system will be weakened unless counsel is permit-
ted to undertake whatever action will improve the chance of his cli-
ent to prevail in the case.42
And again:
When a practice is defended solely on the ground that it is necessary
to support the adversary system, it is fair to ask not only whether it
will further the adversary system, but what its impact on the objec-
tives of our adjudication process will be .... Indeed, it is arguable
that no practice should be defensible solely on the ground that it
supports the adversary system.43
Near the end of the essay this striking passage appears:
[I]t is frankly impossible to explain to the public why a lawyer should
be permitted to present with impunity evidence he knows to be false.
It makes little difference whether the evidence is live testimony or a
document. The public expects that the conduct of lawyers in a court-
room will be at least equal to the behavior expected of laymen in the
ordinary affairs of life. To examine a witness who is telling a story
under oath that the witness and the lawyer know to be false does not
meet the minimum standard of conduct. 44
Pye's approach was to determine, first, what purposes are sought to be
achieved through criminal adjudication and then to inquire whether a
given practice or procedure advances or frustrates those purposes. 45 If
the procedure obstructs the purposes of adjudication by suppressing
truth, one then asks whether the procedure is nevertheless to be retained
because it advances other values of fundamental importance. Thus the
exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases by its nature suppresses
truth, but many have concluded that the protection of basic Fourth
Amendment rights that it may promote justifies its retention. To elimi-
40. A. Kenneth Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth, 1978 DUKE L.J.
921.
41. Id. at 925-26.
42. Id. at 926 (quoting Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949)).
43. Id. at 937.
44. Id. at 950.
45. Pye described the purposes of criminal adjudication to be (1) ascertainment of the
truth of the charges, (2) determination of appropriate sanctions if defendant is found
guilty, and (3) assurance that the processes are performed in accordance with law, i.e., that
the law and facts are properly applied. Id. at 934.
1996]
SMU LAW REVIEW
nate practices resulting in the unjustifiable suppression of truth, Pye be-
lieved the more appropriate approach "is primarily through re-
examination and alteration of evidentiary and procedural law, not
through ethical proscriptions that would preclude counsel from asserting
rights that are available to his client under law." 46
The elimination or modification of the adversary system in the criminal
process has become a popular topic of discussion since the Simpson trial.
Unfortunately, much of the discussion is uninformed and unfocused.
Were Kenneth Pye still with us, his trenchant prose could be relied on to
raise the levels of reason and understanding now prevailing in current
debates. Some version of the adversary process seems clearly mandated
by the bill of rights of the United States Constitution. Indeed, it is the
principal device our system affords to challenge and contain abusive and
unlawful exertions of power by public officials operating within the crimi-
nal justice system. The improper exploitation of the adversary process by
defense attorneys in contested criminal cases calls for thoughtful reme-
dies. There is danger, however, that in concentrating on these important
issues we lose sight of the fact that in the great majority of cases the
adversary process does not operate at all or, at best, only peripherally and
ineffectively. Most criminal defendants are impoverished. Over ninety
percent of felony cases are decided on pleas of guilty.4 7 In the cases in
which impoverished defendants contest their guilt, the inadequacies of
legal aid often limit the effectiveness of their defenses. 48 The result is
that in the great bulk of criminal proceedings public officials are con-
fronted by no effective adversarial challenge to their action. Being
largely immune from consistent challenge and scrutiny, the performance
of many such officials-police, prosecutors, medical examiners, and even
judges-becomes flabby, inefficient, and sometimes in violation of the
law. So entrenched do these dysfunctional habits become that members
of the law-enforcement bureaucracy are sometimes unable to rally to
higher levels of performance even when confronted by high-profile cases
in which severe and well-financed challenges to their initiatives are inevi-
table. Ironically, many who are today urging a drastically truncated ad-
versary process are among those who would most strenuously oppose
substitute measures to scrutinize and contain official exertions of author-
ity in the criminal process, such as systems of external administrative
oversight that prevail in almost all industrial societies except our own.49
Kenneth Pye understood as well as anyone the urgent necessity of rein-
46. Id. at 925.
47. About 752,000 persons, representing 91% of those sentenced for a felony in 1990
pleaded guilty. The rest were found guilty by a jury or by a judge in a bench trial. PAT-
RICK A. LANGAN & RICHARD SOLARI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL JUDICIAL RE-
PORTING PROGRAM, 1990, at 38 (1993).
48. See John B. Arango, Tennessee Indigent Defense System in Crisis, CRIM. JUST.,
Spring 1992, at 42.
49. ALLEN, supra note 27, at 57-58.
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vigorating the adversary process on behalf of the impoverished accused,
and to his contributions in the area of legal aid we now turn.
II. LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR
Kenneth Pye's articles on legal aid expose the basic values on which all
of his work rested. Proper provision of legal assistance to the poor raised
for him issues of personal morality, professional responsibility, and en-
lightened social policy. The depth of his feeling about the problems of
weak, helpless, and uneducated persons confronting a penal system insen-
sitive to their needs and often brutal in its responses, is not wholly hidden
by the discipline of his thought. In a 1966 article, he appended this quite
atypical peroration:
Our alternatives are many, once the strategy is determined. The
time is now. The profession and the nation cannot afford to miss the
opportunity. If we do not determine our strategy soon we can rea-
sonably anticipate a war of attrition in which a decisive victory is
impossible. The legal front of the war against poverty must not be
permitted to grind to a halt in the mud of Passchendaele.
50
The young Kenneth Pye was a committed participant in the national
"War Against Poverty" undertaken by the administration of President
Lyndon Johnson.51 It is easy to dismiss the enthusiasm of those years as
naive and visionary; in fact, excesses were committed in the name of re-
form, and the relations of means and ends were often misconceived. Yet
the history of the "War On Poverty" would have much to teach if we were
receptive to its lessons. It is sobering, too, to inquire whether the ex-
cesses committed in the current "wars" against crime and drugs are not at
least as extreme as those of the "War On Poverty," and perhaps more
destructive to important social values. Pye, of course, was neither a vi-
sionary nor a sentimentalist. His approach to the issues of legal aid was
imbued by the same respect for fact and reason that characterized his
other work.52 The result is a series of essays that retains considerable
50. A. Kenneth Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the Antipoverty Program, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 249 (1966).
51. An early article speaks of the "War Against Poverty" as a "social necessity." It
continues: "We think that [participation] is required by the nature of the lawyer's profes-
sional responsibility and will ultimately inure to the profession's [benefit]." A. Kenneth
Pye & Raymond F. Garraty Jr., The Involvement of the Bar in the War Against Poverty, 41
NOTrm DAME LAW. 860, 861 (1966).
52. Pye's approach to poverty law often evidenced a strong awareness of economic
realities and the dilemmas they create. His skepticism of the then-current attacks on slum
landlordism provides one example:
Is it likely that landlords will repair their premises, maintain them and still
not raise the rent? Or is it more likely that landlords when forced to main-
tain low-cost housing in harmony with housing codes would divert the prop-
erty to another, more profitable use? . . . What is needed are legislative
proposals that will redirect economic resources to maintain rather than de-
stroy the housing that poor families require.
Pye & Cochran, Legal Aid-A Proposal, supra note 23, at 578-79.
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historical and contemporary importance. 53
As is true in all of his writing, Pye approached the topic of legal aid
from a broad social perspective while displaying an impressive command
of the technical aspects of the subject.54 Providing an effective and com-
prehensive system of legal representation of impoverished persons was
for him an integral ingredient of any realistic program of social reform,
and could be expected to advance the interests of all segments of society.
His conception of what is encompassed in an adequate system of legal aid
was unusually broad. He was sensitive to "the fallacy of attempting to
isolate the needs of the poor in the administration of criminal justice from
the overall impact of poverty upon the law,"' 55 as shown by this passage:
"A system which is content to provide counsel in a criminal trial and to
ignore the problems of pretrial release, the social problems resulting from
the defendant's poverty and his incarceration, and the prospects for his
rehabilitation, is very much like a doctor giving morphine to a patient...
with gangrene." '56
And again:
The acquitted defendant is still poor and has substantial problems to
face .... The convicted defendant needs a continuing relationship
with counsel while he is in prison in order effectively to seek a reduc-
tion of sentence, to have representation before the parole board, or
perhaps to prepare a collateral attack on his conviction. His family
needs legal assistance in civil matters while he is in prison.57
When considering the legal needs of the poor, distinctions between
"civil" and "criminal" legal aid are unrealistic and artificial. According to
Pye, "[t]he merger of civil and criminal legal aid is required if we are to
provide legal services that will really meet the needs of the indigent in a
systematic and efficient manner. "58
Pye considered the fostering of effective systems of legal aid to be a
prime responsibility of the legal profession. It was a responsibility that
had not been adequately performed in the past. In 1969, he referred to
"an adverse reaction on the part of the public to a profession that has
been permitted to exercise monopoly power for private gain but then fails
to develop techniques to make its services available to all."'59
53. Pye's published articles on legal-aid issues include the following: Pye & Cochran,
Legal Aid-A Proposal, supra note 23; Pye & Garraty, The Involvement of the Bar in the
War Against Poverty, supra note 51; A. Kenneth Pye, The Legal Needs of the Poor: The
Administration of Criminal Justice, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 286 (1966); Pye, The Role of Legal
Services in the Antipoverty Program, supra note 50.
54. Pye was also interested in efforts of the past to provide legal representation for the
poor. A particularly valuable historical account of the early organizational problems faced
by the Neighborhood Legal Services Project and the erosion of its plans for law reform
may be found in Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the Antipoverty Program, supra note 50,
at 231-43.
55. Pye, The Administration of Criminal Justice, supra note 53, at 299.
56. Id.
57. Pye & Cochran, Legal Aid-A Proposal, supra note 23, at 573.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 528.
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It was much to the legal profession's interest and to that of the country
for the bar to become actively involved in the then-current efforts to
achieve social reform:
Lawyers have a special interest in the determination of whether
[legal institutions] should be preserved, modified or destroyed. They
have power out of keeping with their numbers. The social reformer
and the politician must appreciate the value of the support of the bar
and the disadvantages which may result from its opposition. 60
Pye, however, did not content himself with moral exhortations. He
considered an array of factors that might inhibit the bar's support and
participation in the legal-aid movement, and subjected them to hard-
headed analysis. These factors include such problems as the definition of
standards of indigency, the language of the canon of legal ethics, and the
economics of the profession, including tensions between legal-aid pro-
grams and lawyers practicing on the fringes of the profession. 61
The legal-aid movement of the 1960s was imbued with a strong reform-
ist fervor, and there is no doubt that Kenneth Pye shared the enthusiasm.
Although he wrote that "the basic objective of a national system [of legal
aid] must be to provide lawyers for people who need legal assistance in
the routine problems that they meet in society," 62 reform objectives
loomed largely in his thought. Embracing fundamental reform as integral
to programs of legal aid gives rise to the problem of the "test case," a
problem that has bedeviled the history of the legal-aid movement to the
present. What proportion of effort, if any, should such agencies invest in
litigation the dominant purpose of which is less the vindication of the
rights of the client in the particular case than to effect significant changes
in the functioning of governmental and social institutions? Although
Pye's championing of test cases initiated by legal-aid agencies may have
diminished over time, he never denied their appropriateness in some situ-
ations.63 He took particular pride in the achievements of test litigation in
modifying administrative practice of state welfare programs. In 1969, he
and his co-author calmly, but with moral indignation clearly evident, re-
viewed the harsh procedures employed by some state agencies in ad-
ministering welfare aid to both children and adults. These included
orders terminating grants unsupported by even vestiges of due process,
early-morning raids on the homes of welfare recipients to ferret out viola-
tions of welfare regulations, "maximum grant" limitations, and the like. 64
The authors applauded the efforts of legal-aid agencies to overturn or
modify many of the practices. 65 This history may have considerable mod-
60. Pye & Garraty, The Involvement of the Bar in the War Against Poverty, supra note
51, at 861.
61. Pye & Cochran, Legal Aid-A Proposal, supra note 23, at 533-35.
62. Id. at 568.
63. "We conclude that the dogmatic insistence that all legal services programs adopt a
test case approach is not desirable. Nevertheless, some test cases are clearly desirable." Id.
at 579.




ern relevance; the record of the states in administering federally-funded
welfare systems thirty years ago may engender understandable unease
about current proposals for the creation of welfare systems at the state
level subjected to much less national supervision than in the past.
For all his support of the test case, Pye understood the limitations of
reform-through-litigation better than most of his contemporaries. There
was, first, the problem of the backlash, the problem of legal-aid agencies
losing the good will of the political bodies upon which they depended for
funding and other forms of support. The problem is real and continuing,
and at present threatens the survival of national programs of legal aid, as
today's newspaper headlines abundantly demonstrate. 66 Pye accurately
anticipated the difficulties when he wrote that "[o]ne cannot successfully
require local policy-making, and also expect priority to be given to the
kind of basic changes thought desirable ... but which the local political
system is not yet prepared to make. ' '67 He reiterated that "[iut should be
recognized that the consensus which forms the basis for bar support may
be jeopardized if the OEO requires local communities to allocate re-
sources to activities aimed at institutional reform. '68
Another equally cogent reason for more selective uses of test-case liti-
gation is its limited utility as a device to effect reform. Pye did not doubt
that "[t]he results of [test-case] litigation have clearly worked to the bene-
fit of millions of Americans. '69 But "[t]o accomplish more fundamental
changes in these areas, a legal services program must not only litigate; it
must be able to develop a legislative program. '70 For example, "[t]here is
strong reason for suggesting that legal services programs, when armed
with available material, their own independent studies, and the handwrit-
ing on the wall of recent decisions, could deal more effectively with the
issue of court costs in the state legislatures than in case-by-case
adjudications. 71
Pye's advocacy of legislation as a primary instrumentality of reform,
while not wholly unique to him, distinguishes his position from that of
many of his colleagues in the legal-aid movement of the 1960s. Most of
those active in the movement at that time, nurtured by the Warren Court,
displayed a confidence in reforms secured in courts unsupported by a
democratic consensus. The immediate results of such court-imposed in-
novations were often desirable, and the long-term effects of some of them
have been salutary; but the permanence of reform is threatened by the
failure of reformers to undertake the hard task of winning the support of
public opinion for such changes. The present political era demonstrates,
in part, the consequences of such failure.
66. See Peter T. Kilborn, For LegalAid, Tough Times Get Tougher, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,
1995, at 6.
67. Pye & Cochran, Legal Aid-A Proposal, supra note 23, at 575.
68. Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the Antipoverty Program, supra note 50, at 244.
69. Pye & Cochran, Legal Aid-A Proposal, supra note 23, at 576.




As would be expected, Pye's contributions to legal aid literature are
not confined to discussions of social theory and broad issues of public
policy. He also gave close attention to such immediately practical issues
as the organization of legal services agencies. His views on institutional
forms were strikingly eclectic. He recognized that varying conditions pre-
vailing in different communities may require differing responses.72 He
was convinced, however, that the overwhelming weight of numbers may
make establishment of public defender offices inevitable in urban set-
tings.73 His own extensive experience as an administrator of legal serv-
ices to impoverished residents of the District of Columbia convinced him
of the utility of a mixed system of legal aid employing the services of both
a public legal-aid agency and private attorneys:
The operation of the [District of Columbia] Legal Aid Agency has
shown, however, that a mixed public-private defender system can op-
erate without any of the defects alleged to exist in public defender
systems. The burden on the bar has been reduced substantially. At
the same time the bar has not lost contact with the criminal pro-
cess-it continues to display interest in the system and to contribute
imagination and expertise to the defense of the poor. This combina-
tion of public appropriations and responsibility vested in the bar has
proved to be an efficacious method for assuring effective representa-
tion of defendants. 74
Despite the many dedicated persons who have devoted strenuous and
sometimes heroic efforts to the legal representation of the poor in the
years since Kenneth Pye wrote, it is clear that his high hopes for achieving
something like equality for poor persons in the criminal process have not
been realized. Many reasons, some of them ideological, could be ad-
vanced for this failure. Among the most important of these is the aston-
ishing growth in the number of criminal cases in the last thirty years,
caused in important part by such policies as the "war on drugs."'75 A
need for legal services of such magnitude has been created that many
localities are unable or unwilling to provide them. 76 Failures to respond
adequately to these obligations, even in capital cases, have not in the
present climate of opinion sufficiently engaged the attention and con-
science of the public, the courts, and the legal profession. If someday we
are able again to give serious thought to the issues Kenneth Pye ad-
dressed thirty years ago, his essays will be available to supply wisdom and
guidance.
72. Pye, The Legal Needs of the Poor, supra note 53, at 289.
73. Id. at 290.
74. Id. at 291-92.
75. The number of accused persons sentenced to prison in the federal courts alone
grew from about 17,500 in 1982 to 33,600 in 1992. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1993 494-95 tbl. 5.22 (1994).
76. See, e.g., Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Com-
pelled to Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363 (1993); Esther F.
Lardent & Douglas M. Cohen, The Last Best Hope: Representing Death Row Inmates, 23
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 213 (1989).
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III. THE LAW OF CIVIL DISORDERS
In 1975, Kenneth Pye published his most ambitious scholarly effort. It
is a book-length, two-part article, written with co-author Cym H. Lowell,
and entitled The Criminal Process During Civil Disorders.77 The issues
addressed are of extraordinary difficulty and intricacy; a fully adequate
summary would require far more delineation than can be supplied here.
The context of the study was, of course, the urban riots that erupted
across the country in the late 1960s and early 1970s, prompted by opposi-
tion to the Vietnam war and racial unrest. The subjects discussed by the
authors, however, are of great current relevance. Urban riots still
threaten our social bonds, and the dangers posed by strongly armed ter-
rorist groups, foreign and domestic, present analogous concerns.
The article takes strong stands in support of public authority to sup-
press such uprisings. Pye found no incongruity, as a civil libertarian, in
urging suspension of some individual rights given constitutional protec-
tion in normal times, in the interests of restoring public order.78 For him,
civil liberty is the fruit of law, and assaults on the legal order are to be
understood as attacks on liberty.79 He believed, however, that the meas-
ures he supported would, in the long run, impinge less on basic liberties
than prevailing methods of suppressing civil disorders. The authors sum-
marize their thesis as follows:
It is the purpose of this Article ... to examine the manner in which
the civilian institutions of justice should operate when faced with ma-
jor disorder, the circumstances under which troops may be used to
assist civilian authorities in restoring order, and the powers of troops
and police under emergency conditions. It is our thesis that the pur-
poses of the criminal process during times of civil emergency have
77. A. Kenneth Pye & Cym H. Lowell, The Criminal Process During Civil Disorders
(pts. 1 & 2), 1975 DUKE L.J. 581, 1021. One of the purposes of this article was to provide
refutation for certain of the arguments and conclusions advanced by David E. Engdahl in a
series of articles published by him between 1971 and 1973. Professor Engdahl's articles
include Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution: The Law and History of Military Troops in Civil
Disorders, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1971); Due Process Forbids Soldiers in Civil Disorders, AM.
REP., Nov. 12, 1971, at G-5; A Comprehensive Study of the Use of Military Troops in Civil
Disorders with Proposals for Legislative Reform, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 399 (1972); The
Legal Background and Aftermath of the Kent State Tragedy, 22 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 3 (1973).
78. "[W]e in no way depreciate the importance of understanding and, where possible,
dealing effectively with the underlying causes of civil disorder. We also reject the notion
that there is anything inconsistent in developing a capacity to maintain order while simulta-
neously engaging in political and social reform." Pye & Lowell, supra note 77, at 588.
79. Interestingly enough, the first paragraph of the article contains a statement of Al-
exander Hamilton, one sentence of which follows: "In a government framed for durable
liberty, no less regard must be paid to giving the magistrate a proper degree of authority to
make and execute laws with rigor than to guarding against encroachments upon the rights
of the community." Id. at 581-82 (quoting Alexander Hamilton, The Continentalist, July
12, 1781, in II THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 651 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds.,
1961)). There is no evidence that Pye's vigorous support of basic individual liberties ever
weakened, or that he lost enthusiasm for political and social reform. There is some indica-
tion, however, that in the 1970s he found it necessary to devote greater attention to the
criminal law as an instrumentality of social defense than in his earlier years. It seems likely
that the riots of the 1960s and 1970s, and the unruly and sometimes violent campus protests
in the Vietnam period, were factors in his apparent shift of attention.
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not been generally understood and that a proper understanding dic-
tates the conclusion that broader powers of arrest, search, and deten-
tion be entrusted to police and courts. Our thesis will also suggest
that military forces may be appropriately used in support of civilian
police where the disorder is of a magnitude which is beyond the lat-
ter's power to quell; but that, when so utilized the powers of the
military should be no greater than those that may be exercised by the
civilian police. 80
The starting point of the article's argument is an inquiry into the pur-
poses of the criminal law during times of extreme civil disorder: "Unlike
its function in non-emergency periods, the criminal process in emergency
situations is not primarily punitive, deterrent, rehabilitative, or retribu-
tive. Rather it is preventive and restorative."'8 1 A massive civil disorder
should be recognized as a phenomenon justifying different responses by
the criminal law from those in normal times. Pye believed that some po-
lice and judicial measures, now regarded as unlawful, may meet the con-
stitutional test "if authorized by statute and justified by policy
considerations."82
The case for enlarging certain police and judicial powers during serious
civil disorders is made to rest on several grounds. First, the expansion of
civilian authority is necessary to hasten termination of riots and their at-
tendant violence and property destruction.8 3 If, it is argued, the police
are limited to powers available in normal times, pressures will be exerted
to enlarge those powers to make them more adequate in times of emer-
gency, an expansion that may leave the rights of persons more narrowly
defined in normal times. Thus "[f]ailure to respond realistically to the
legal problems created by a civil disorder may result in a diminution of
civil liberties not only during the brief period of the emergency, but
permanently."84
A further reason to enlarge civilian authority during emergencies is to
limit resort to the military during such periods. The authors have no
doubt that calling upon the military for assistance when civilian authority
has demonstrated incapacity to suppress disorders is both lawful and nec-
essary.85 But we ought not to provide incentives for military
interventions:
[T]here should be no incentive for either state or federal executives
to use the troops instead of the civilian police as a means of quelling
disorder. Such an incentive does ... exist if the civilian police are
80. Id. at 587-88.
81. Id. at 597.
82. Id. at 595.
83. "We also think that the danger of massive violence is lessened if police and courts
have greater powers .... But containment and dispersal do not necessarily require massive
firepower." Id. at 602.
84. Id. at 600.
85. "[W]e fundamentally disagree with the conclusion that military force may not or
should not be used for [quelling civil disorders] if the ordinary civil procedures prove un-
able to maintain order." Id. at 657.
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tightly limited to their normal non-emergency powers while the mili-
tary is given broader discretionary authority to deal with disorders.8 6
Thus, when the military is summoned to suppress disorder it should be
held to the same legal standards as those defined in advance for the civil-
ian police and courts; and to make the mandate feasible, civilian authority
must be enlarged in certain aspects.
The second part of the article is largely devoted to discussion of the
areas in which the authors believed police and judicial authority should
be enlarged during civil disturbances, and the reasons for such expansion.
The argument is detailed and lengthy, and only a sketch can be given
here. The authors would increase discretionary police arrest powers, in-
cluding discretion to withhold arrest when offenses are committed in the
officers' presence, and power to release arrested persons without judicial
intervention when it is clear that the case would be nolle prossed if left in
the system. 87 "Control over the exercise of this discretion should be ac-
complished by promulgation of rules and regulations to guide its exer-
cise." 88 Nevertheless, specific limits should be imposed on arrest powers:
[W]e think it unnecessary, unwise, and unconstitutional to provide
... broad powers to the police [to arrest persons who have commit-
ted no offense but who the police believe are about to do so]. The
practical problems faced by police in a civil disturbance can be dealt
with more effectively, and with less danger to civil liberties, by ex-
panding the range of conduct which is unlawful during such an emer-
gency [an example being possession of incendiary devices].89
Curfews would be authorized 9° and powers to establish road blocks ex-
panded.91 "Stop and frisk" would be validated.92 Statutes should ex-
pressly authorize searches without a warrant for objects capable of
injuring persons or damaging property, but searches must be supported
by probable cause. 93 Warrantless area searches are rejected:
An area search is by its nature likely to invade the privacy of persons
who are completely innocent of any wrongdoing .... It is not asking
too much to require submission of the proposed search to a judicial
officer before such a step is undertaken. Emergency searches of par-
ticular dwellings may sometimes be justified without a warrant, but
area searches should always require one.94
The authors would permit courts in some situations to detain persons
likely to reenter the riot zone, and to suspend their rights of bail even if
serious crimes are not expected of them. The objective of bail require-
86. Id. at 636-37.
87. Id. at 1031-32.
88. Id. at 1033.
89. Id. at 1036.
90. Id. at 1037-38.
91. Id at 1062.
92. "In the context of civil disorder, the indignity of the stop and frisk seems minor
compared to the importance of assuring that armed persons are not on the streets. In a
sense, it is a lesser restriction than a curfew .... ." Id. at 1044.
93. Id. at 1051.
94. Id. at 1059.
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ments in normal times-to prevent the accused from fleeing before his
trial-is largely inapplicable in the riot situation: "It is respectfully sub-
mitted that any sane society might grant such a defendant pretrial release
if he promised to flee, but would deny it to him if he is likely to remain in
the riot area. '95
As Kenneth Pye was well aware, the issues confronted in the article are
contentious and difficult. He could not have expected complete agree-
ment with all the positions advanced. But the article does more than de-
fend conclusions on the particular points considered. It also makes a
more general argument in favor of providing rational and systematic stat-
utory guidance to public officers called upon to suppress future civil dis-
orders. 96 The desirability of subjecting official conduct to the rule of law
in such massive and destructive upheavals, rather than tolerating action
based on an amorphous and unguided discretion, is difficult to question.
Clear and carefully formulated statutory mandates may be expected not
only to minimize unnecessary infringements of personal liberty in times
of emergency, but they may also contribute to the efficiency of efforts to
quell disorders; for one source of ineffectiveness of official action in riot
situations has been doubt and uncertainty about the legal boundaries of
official action. Yet, desirable as such statutory guidance would likely
prove, the difficulties of achieving the necessary intelligent and dispas-
sionate legislative consideration of such issues in periods of comparative
calm are formidable. There is no issue so dead as last year's crisis. Other
more immediate problems clamor for legislative attention. Groups re-
sisting any statutory limitations on official authority and those opposing
any narrowing of individual rights can be expected to oppose legislative
initiatives. Yet Pye was clearly right in urging reasoned consideration of
penal policy in these difficult areas, and perhaps we may one day be per-
suaded to act on his advice.
A second general observation may be offered. Some persons may re-
sist enlarging police powers in riot situations beyond the constitutional
limits applicable to more normal times because of what might be called
the "infection effect." Modem history is replete with instances of meas-
ures ostensibly taken to limit individual rights in emergency situations
being applied in the course of time to a whole range of law-enforcement
activity in which no emergencies exist.97 Pye was aware of the problem of
95. Id. at 1073. The article contains a list of broad legislative measures the authors
believed essential to the lawful containment of civil disorders; some of those proposals
have not been touched on in the brief summary above. Id. at 1093.
96. "In substance, the issue is whether crucial decisions involving public safety and
individual rights will be made in periods of comparative calm by popularly elected legisla-
tures or in the tumult of a disorder by civilian or military executives." Id. at 1089.
97. A somber account of the current state of criminal justice in Britain has been
presented in recent newspaper accounts. See, e.g., Ray Moseley, Critics Say Legal Rights
Latest Ulster Casualty, Cmi. TRIB., Oct. 17, 1993, §1, at 1, 14, 15; Ray Moseley, Cops,
Courts, Stifle Britons' Rights, Cii. TRIB., Oct. 18, 1993, §1, at 1, 13; see also Nina Zaltzman
& Eli Lederman, The Gradual Erosion of Defendant's Status in Israeli Law, 62 TEMP. L.
REv. 1175, 1177 (1989); Dermont Walsh, The Impact of Antisubversive Laws on Police
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confining emergency powers to emergencies. His answer was that emer-
gency powers should be explicitly limited by legislation to the emergency
period, and that methods for clearly determining the beginning and ter-
mination of the emergency should be statutorily mandated. 98 The mod-
ern threat of terrorist activity had not emerged when the article was being
written. The "infection effect" of antiterrorist legislation may prove a
more intractable problem than that threatened in the riot situation which
Pye addressed. This is so, in part, because it may be impossible to define
the beginning and end of threats of terrorist violence.
A final comment about the article should be made. Not all readers will
agree with all positions defended by the authors, but all but very few will
turn from the article impressed by the authorities and historical experi-
ence marshalled and by the range of considerations offered. Any future
writing in the field will be required to give the article close attention.
IV. UNIVERSITY EDUCATION
It is the fate of educational administrators-deans and college presi-
dents-to be called on for written pronouncements on the past, present,
and future of American education. The resulting literature, it must be
said, is rarely invigorating, and is often pretentious, melancholy, and de-
pressing. Kenneth Pye, of course, made obligatory contributions to the
literature; but it is more than friendly bias, I believe, that prompts the
observation that his contributions were far more substantive and sprightly
than most. Pye understood the hazards of the genre: "Unfortunately, the
subject of [legal] education ... is about as new to [the practicing bar] as
would be a discussion of sin at a meeting of the College of Cardinals."99
A systematic summary of Pye's views on law schools and universities will
not be attempted here,100 but a glance at some of his observations is of
interest because they so clearly reveal the man.
Kenneth Pye's formidable candor makes itself apparent in these essays.
On one occasion he wrote: "[T]here is often a 'Robin Hood' element in
charging higher tuition and recycling that tuition to enable disadvantaged
students to attend institutions they could not otherwise afford." 101 And
again: "Most faculty teach fewer courses than they did two decades ago.
Powers and Practices in Ireland: The Silent Erosion of Individual Freedom, 62 TEMP. L.
REV. 1099, 1106 (1989).
98. Pye & Lowell, The Criminal Process During Civil Disorders, supra note 77, at
1078, 1093.
99. A. Kenneth Pye, Clinical Education in the Law Schools, 39 BAR EXAM. 9 (1970).
100. Pye's published essays on university education include the following: What's
Wrong With Our Universities?-An Additional View, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 335
(1991); Legal Education in an Era of Change: The Challenge, 1987 DUKE L.J. 191; Solvency
and Survival After the Boom-A Different Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 462 (1984) (with
John R. Kramer); Legal Education Past and Future: A Summer Carol, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC.
367 (1982); Clinical Education in the Law Schools, supra note 99; Problems in Legal Educa-
tion (A Survey), 19 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 427 (1970); Law School Training in Criminal Law: A
Teacher's Viewpoint, 3 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 173 (1965); Legal Internships: Georgetown's Experi-
ment in Legal Education, 49 A.B.A. J. 554 (1963).
101. Pye, What's Wrong With Our Universities, supra note 100, at 339.
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It is not self-evident that their teaching is significantly better. Nor is it
clear that the quality, as distinguished from the quantity, of published
scholarship is much better.' 10 2 With great gusto he could launch barbs
against the attitudes and performance of his colleagues in law schools and
universities. On one occasion he observed: "[A] perusal of the recent
editions of the Journal of Legal Education suggests that legal educators
appear to be at a point midway between introspection and self-
flagellation.' 10 3
Pye's sometimes acerbic comments reflected his conviction of the im-
portance of universities in American society and an intense concern that
educational institutions more faithfully serve the needs their functions are
intended to satisfy. In 1991, he published a response to an article by
Derek Bok, the retiring president of Harvard University.' 0" Pye's essay
is of particular interest, for it appeared near the end of Pye's distin-
guished career in educational administration, and may be taken as a
statement of many of his mature views on the present state of American
universities. In his article, Bok had stated several criteria to measure uni-
versity performance. Pye responded by noting that
very few universities will be viewed as performing well if judged by
all of his criteria .... The problem for most institutions is not ac-
ceptance of Bok's criteria in the abstract, but knowing where and
how to seek an appropriate balance with the finite resources avail-
able . . .. [B]alance and priorities are the real issues for most
universities. 105
One of the most-discussed issues of balance and priority is that of ad-
justing what are asserted to be the conflicting claims of teaching and
faculty research. Rather clearly, Pye would have elevated teaching com-
petence to a higher level of importance in promotion decisions than
would Bok. Pye states: "Although in most institutions specialization is
the order of the day, it is conceivable that, even in a research university,
there is a role for someone whose principal forte is good teaching, accom-
panied by only modest research.' 0 6 Obviously, this does not end the
matter. Particularly in state universities there is danger that the call for
more teaching by full-time faculty may be taken up by politicians seeking
a popular issue, with the result that regulations may be imposed that seri-
ously weaken the capacity of the universities to meet their research obli-
gations. Pye's personal experience, of course, made him aware of the
difficulties of achieving rational accommodations in these areas. He pre-
dicted that university decisions to forego emphasis on research will not
willingly be made in any foreseeable future. Such decisions "would hin-
der [the] institution's recruitment of students, deter many able young
faculty from joining its ranks, and significantly impair the self-esteem of
102. Pye, Legal Education Past and Future, supra note 100, at 380.
103. Pye, Legal Education in an Era of Change, supra note 100, at 199.
104. Pye, What's Wrong With Our Universities, supra note 100.
105. Id. at 338.
106. Id. at 341-42.
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existing faculty.' 10 7
Pye was dissatisfied with the tenure practices in American universities:
"No other profession, besides the priesthood, provides lifetime employ-
ment on the basis of a decision made about someone who is not yet
forty."'1 08 Recognizing that faculty tenure has contributed importantly to
academic freedom in the past, he urged consideration of new methods to
secure that end in the future while guarding against teaching and research
incompetence of some aging faculty members: "One such method might
be for universities to extend initial, short-term contracts, to be followed
by more lengthy contracts, which gradually diminish in length as the
faculty member reaches advanced age. Periodic review by peers at regu-
lar intervals could also be instituted.' 0 9
As is true of most of us, Pye was frustrated by the inanities of published
"rankings" of universities and university departments, such as those is-
sued by U.S. News and World Report: "It would be easy to ignore such
rankings if they did not have a significant impact upon students' choices
of where best to study. It could be that many undergraduate students will
receive the weakest undergraduate education at some institutions with
the highest research productivity . . .110
In an earlier article, Pye "was struck with how rarely faculty apply their
professional talents to the problems of ... education.""' Applying his
professional skills to educational problems is precisely what Kenneth Pye
did as an educational administrator and as a commentator on university
issues. He acquired an impressive store of information on all aspects of
the educational process, and developed a sensitive awareness of the inter-
relations of problems whose connections are often overlooked. He
clearly perceived that how curricular, pedagogical, and intellectual
problems are confronted in the universities will inevitably be conditioned
by how issues of student aid, governmental fiscal policy, salary discrepan-
cies, and a host of others are resolved. 1 2 His detailed understanding of
this complex of interrelated factors contributed to a great part of his
power as an educational leader.
It was highly appropriate that, when Kenneth Pye resigned from the
presidency of Southern Methodist University, its law school conferred on
him a high academic honor, the William Hawley Atwell Professorship of
Constitutional Law. This was more than a pro forma award for one who
had rendered administrative services to the University. Instead, it can be
understood as symbolic of a distinguished career in which teaching and
scholarship were always a central concern. Had his life been spared, we
107. Id. at 345.
108. Id. at 349-50.
109. Id. at 350.
110. Id. at 345.
111. Pye, Legal Education Past and Future, supra note 100, at 378.
112. See id. at 378-79.
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can be certain that he would have published other distinguished contribu-
tions reflecting a lifetime of thought, dedication, and unique experience.
It is impossible not to regret our loss. This is not a time, however, to
count our losses, but rather one to celebrate his achievements and charac-
ter. There is much to celebrate.

